Environmental Justice Risks in the Petroleum Industry by Whitehead, Roy, Jr. & Block, Walter
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 4
Environmental Justice Risks in the Petroleum
Industry
Roy Whitehead Jr.
Walter Block
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Roy Whitehead Jr. and Walter Block, Environmental Justice Risks in the Petroleum Industry, 24 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 67 (2000), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol24/iss1/4
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RISKS IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY
RoY WHITEHEAD, JR.- AND WALTER BLOCK'
I. THE HAZARD
In practically all of its various forms, petroleum is potentially
hazardous to the environment. As a result, virtually every activity
engaged in by the petroleum industry can have profound environmental
implications. For many years, environmental considerations have played a
role in decisions regarding the siting of petroleum production, refining, or
storage facilities. Recent case law and regulatory developments in
"environmental justice," however, assure that environmental
considerations that affect minority communities will play an increasingly
critical economic role in both the permitting process and, perhaps most
importantly, the permit renewal process. This article discusses the recent
developments, suggests preventive management techniques to deal with
the new challenges, and proposes a better process of environmental justice
in order to benefit minority populations living near the sites. The article
will accomplish this by addressing the legal and regulatory environmental
barriers to the petroleum site permitting and renewal process, reviewing
the Environmental Protection Agency's "environmental justice"
compliance guidance, and suggesting pre-permit management techniques
to educate citizens of the affected community so as to minimize the hidden
contingent costs of "environmental justice" complaints.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas. J.D. and LL.M.,
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. I am indebted to James Kent and Dick Merritt of
JKA Associates, Aspen, Colorado, for their encouragement and advice. Any errors or
omissions are the author's.
t Dr. Walter Block is Chairman of the Department of Economics and Finance at the
University of Central Arkansas. A graduate of Columbia University (Ph.D. 1972), he is
the author of eight books, editor of two dozen more, and has had over one hundred
articles published in refereed journals and law reviews.
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II. BACKGROUND
To, incorporate environmental considerations into capital
budgeting, a company must constantly monitor changes in environmental
law. Astute petroleum executives, attorneys, controllers, auditors,
investors and management accountants must be able to identify potential
hidden environmental costs resulting from compliance with environmental
regulations. The Institute of Management, Accountants has recognized this
need by issuing two helpful statements, No. 4W, Implementing Corporate
Environmental Strategies, and No. 4Z, Tools and Techniques of
Environmental Accounting for Business Decisions.
Few contemporary issues are more emotionally charged than
environmentalism and its underlying values. Legitimate policy
controversies are generally portrayed. as battles between victimized
citizens and corporate polluters. In this context, it is difficult not to side
with the environmentalists.'
This context, however, often -represents a misleading and false
dichotomy, which may actually operate to direct beneficial social and
economic resources away from the poor, minority communities that the
regulations were intended to benefit.' It is reasonable to assume that the
type of community most likely to accept a new factory would be a town
where more jobs are needed and increased tax revenue from the facility
would benefit the area.. There is scant evidence that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") takes into account the wishes or needs of the
affected minority community in the decision making process.3 Decision
makers must be aware that their good faith motives and community
support for a facility may not be determinative with government regulators
and the courts.
III. STUDIES
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of empirical studies
purported to find evidence of environmental injustice. One 'of the first
studies examined population data for Houston, Texas area communities
See Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 151, 151 (1997).
2 See id. at 151.
For example, in the Louisiana Shintech matter (see infra Part IX) 73% of the black
residents and 100% of the black public officials favored the plant. See Robyn Blumner,
Standing in the Way of Jobs, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at C7.
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where landfills and incinerators were located. The study concluded that
minority neighborhoods supported a disproportionate number of waste
facilities.' A second study, conducted by the U.S. General Accounting
Office in 1983, analyzed -population demographics in communities
adjacent to waste facilities in the Southeast.6 This study also reported that
a disproportionate number of such facilities were located in minority
and/or poor communities.7 Another frequently cited study was published
by the Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ in
891987. It too reported evidence of environmental racism.'
Although many of these studies have been frequently cited in order
to bolster the position taken by advocates of the environmental justice
cause, some experts have questioned the results of the studies on the basis
of methodological flaws. One such problem has to do with the studies'
definition for "minority communities" which classifies any community as
a minority community if it has a higher proportion of nonwhite residents
than that reflected in national statistics.'0  As a result, the studies
categorize some communities as "minority" even if they have a large
majority of non-minority residents. A related problem is that the studies
focus on the minority proportion of the population in high pollution areas,
rather than population densities. As a result, the studies ignore the actual
number of minority or low-income residents exposed to hazardous waste."
Still another potential flaw-of these studies is the potential for significant
aggregation error resulting from defining geographic areas too broadly. 2
These studies have also failed to consider the timing of hazardous
material sitings relative to shifts in the population. 3 In other words, due to
4 Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC.
INQUIRY 273 (1983).
' See id. at 285.
6 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPT. No. RCED-83-168, SITING OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES REPORT (1983).
7 See generally id.
THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, ToxIc WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
' See generally id.
1o See Laura Pulido, A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism
Research, 28 ANTIPODE 142 (1996).
"See id.
'
2 See id.
'3 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1385 (1994).
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the dynamic nature of the housing market, population shifts toward a
higher proportion of minority and/or poor residents may have occurred
after the siting of hazardous material facilities in some locations.' 4 In fact,
one article suggests that economic factors, not environmental racism, are
the real cause of the observed population differences surrounding
hazardous materials facilities. 5 Another problem with much of the
environmental justice research is that the studies focus exclusively on the
number of facilities located in minority/poor neighborhoods, failing to
consider the amount and type of pollution actually involved. 6
IV. A DEFINITION
The Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental
justice as fair treatment for people of all races, cultures, and incomes,
regarding the development of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.'7 Since the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the
incidence of claims that minority and low income populations bear a
disproportionate amount of negative health and environmental effects from
pollution, often as a result of environmental racism-the intentional siting
of hazardous waste facilities in predominately minority and low-income
areas.'" Now the President, the EPA, and the courts have acted to expand
greatly the definition of "environmental justice" to include not only the
evils of intentional discrimination, but also unintended "disparate impact"
discrimination. 9
Disparate impact discrimination flows from practices that are not
intended to discriminate, but for some reason have an unintended, but
discriminatory, disparate effect on a protected class.2" For example, an
employer may have a policy that it only hires the relatives of current
employees. Well-intentioned reasons may exist for this policy, such as
increasing employees' loyalty to and knowledge of the company.
14 See id. at 1388.
"S Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes,
Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. REG. 195 (1997).
16 Andrew Holmes & Larry B. Cowart, Environmental Racism: The New Liability for
Industrial Site Selection, REAL ESTATE ISSUES, Apr. 1996, at 1.
"7 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 (1999) (prohibiting discrimination under any EPA
program or activity).
"S ee Blumner, supra note 3, at C7.
'9 See id.
20 See id.
[Vol. 24: 67
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RISKS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 71
However, if all the current employees are white, the policy will have a
discriminatory disparate impact on qualified blacks, who will never be
employed at this company. The Clinton Administration and the EPA seem
to believe that there is a vast conspiracy between state environmental
regulators and regulated industries to impose a disparate impact by
locating industrial facilities in low-income and minority neighborhoods."
V. SETT'ING THE STAGE
Whether or not claims of environmental racism are adequately
supported by sound scientific research, President Clinton moved
environmental justice to the forefront of the national agenda when he
issued Executive Order 12898 on February 11, 1994.22 This Order broadly
provides that "disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects . . . on minority populations and low-income
populations"23 shall be identified and addressed. The Order further
requires each cabinet of the government to make environmental justice a
part of its mission.24
In the past, it was generally accepted that federal or state
permitting agencies served as gatekeepers to which private individuals or
groups must submit their opposition to siting permits. These agencies
could then exercise discretion in dealing with such challenges. However,
several recent significant developments, in the form of a court of appeals
decision," an EPA policy statement,26 and a controversial EPA decision in
the Louisiana Shintech case27 have the potential to open the floodgates for
additional private actions in environmental permitting for plant sites. The
obvious result would be a dramatic increase in the legal and contingent
economic costs associated with siting of industrial facilities.
21 See id.
22 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2Id. at 859.
24 See id.
25 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
26 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998), available at <http://www.
epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi/html> [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDANCE].
27 In re Shintech, 746 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
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VI. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
The first critical question is whether private individuals or
environmental activists have an implied private cause of action in federal
court to challenge the permitting and permit renewal process without first
exhausting available remedies with state or federal permitting agencies.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided an affirmative answer
to this question when it discovered that a private cause of action does exist
to challenge the plant permitting process.28 In February 1998, the
Environmental Protection Agency seized the initiative when, citing the
President's Executive Order, it issued a policy statement in the form of an
interim guidance that clearly recognizes a private cause of action in both
initial site permitting, and more surprisingly, the permit renewal
processes.29
Both the court decision and the EPA interim guidance are rooted in
an interpretation of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act").3 ° Title VI of
the Act says that "no person in the United States shall, on the grounds of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."31 Whether the Act infers a
private right of action in an environmental siting case has been the subject
of considerable conjecture. 2
VII. THE CHESTER CASE AND PRIVATE PERMIT CHALLENGES
When decided, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif " was widely regarded as having the same effect on environmental
28 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 932-37 (3d
Cir. 1997).
29 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 3.
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
32 See generally Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.
1982) (alleging racial discrimination in denial of staff privileges at federally-assisted
hospital); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
(asserting discriminatory impact of police appointments made based on written
examination scores); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (claiming that limitation
on number of allowed hospital days funded under Medicaid has a disproportionate and
discriminatory effect on the handicapped).
" 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
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law as the Brown v. Board of Education34 desegregation case did on
education law. Although the appeal of the Chester decision was recently
vacatedrby the U.S. Supreme Court as moot because the contested facility
decided to surrender the challenged permit in question,35 the initial
decision provides a valuable roadmap to follow for courts evaluating
private causes of action. It is beneficial to understand the case because, the
theory espoused by the court is recognized by other federal circuits, is
cited in EPA permitting regulations, and cases like it will surely arise
again.
In Chester, the appellate court dealt with the issue of whether a
private cause of action exists under Title VI to challenge the permitting
process.36 "The City of Chester is located in Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, and has a population of approximately 42,000, of which
65% is black and 32% is white. Delaware County, excluding Chester, has
a population of about 502,000 of Which 6.2% is black and 91% is white."37
The environmental group, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living, contended that state and environmental authorities had
granted five waste facility permits for sites in the City of Chester
since 1987, while only granting two permits for sites in the rest of
Delaware County. It further alleges that the Chester facilities have
a total permit capacity of 2.1 million tons of waste per year, while
the non-Chester facilities have a total permit capacity of only 1,400
tons of waste per year.8
The court was faced with the question of whether a private right of
action exists under the Discriminatory Effect Regulations promulgated by
a federal administrative agency (EPA) under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.31 The original trial court found that no private right of action
exists that would allow a private individual to enforce the EPA civil rights
34 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" See Seif v. Chester, 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340
U.S. 36 (1950) for the proposition that the withdrawal of the permit application rendered
the case moot).
36 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 927.
" See id. at 927, n. 1.
38 id.
39 See id.
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regulations,"° thus affirming that the state permitting agency,,acts as a
gatekeeper for such complaints. Title VI and the EPA's civil rights
implementing regulations condition the receipt of federal funding by a
state's permitting agency on its assurance that it complies with Title VI
and the regulations.4 "[T]hese regulations prohibit recipients of federal
funding from using 'criteria or methods ...which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
national origin, or sex .... 142
On appeal, the Third Circuit decided that in the absence of a
specific statutory authorization, there is a three-pronged test -to determine
when it is appropriate to imply a private right of action to enforce
government regulations. 43 The test requires the court to determine "(1)
'whether the issue is properly within the scope of the enabling statute'; (2)
'whether the statute under which the rule was promulgated properly
permits the implication of a private right of action'; and (3) 'whether
implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the enabling
statute."'"
The appellate court said that "[t]here [was] no question that the
EPA's discriminatory effect regulation satisfies the first prong."45  The
court also said it is clear that "'actions having an unjustifiable disparate
impact on minorities [can] be redressed through agency regulations
designed to implement the purpose of Title VI.'"4 Announcing that the
second and third prongs determined whether a private right of action
existed,47 the court found that it had to consider the relevant factors of "(1)
whether there is 'any indication of legislative intent, explicit and implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one'; and (2) whether it is
'consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff."'"
40 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F.Supp. 413, 417
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
4' See 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a) (1999).
42 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir.
1997) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997)).
41 See id. at 933.
"Id. (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988)).
45 id.
46 Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)).
47 See id.
41 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 933 (3d Cir.
1997) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
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The court reviewed the law and regulations and agreed that there
was some weight to the argument that the EPA, or a state permitting
agency, acts only "as a gatekeeper to enforcement, with private parties
submitting their allegations to the agency and its discretion. ' The court
failed to enlighten the litigants by citing any explicit examples of a
legislative intent to confer a private cause of action. 0 It decided that
private lawsuits are consistent with the underlying legislative scheme of
Title VI.5 The court also said that a private right of action is desirable
"because it will deputize private attorneys general who will enforce
section 602 and its implementing regulations"52 and will further the
purposes of Title VI."
The foregoing decision should serve as a signal to those involved
in risk management and siting decisions to consider carefully the
discrimination issues involving disparate impact raised in the Chester
case. The case, however, leaves unresolved several important questions.
Is there a cause of action, for example, in the renewal of a site license?
The interim guidance released by the EPA shortly after the Chester
decision deals with that question.
VIII. EPA INTERIM GUIDANCE FOLLOWS CHESTER
On February 5, 1998, in connection with the President's Executive
Order 12898, Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice In
Minority Populations and Low Income Populations, the EPA issued its
Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits ("the Guidance"). The EPA cites the Chester case
with approval and flatly states that "individuals may file a private right of
action in court to enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI
or EPA's implementing regulations without exhausting administrative
remedies."54 With the interim guidance, this means that the EPA and state
permitting agencies are no longer considered by the agency as
gatekeepers; private individuals now gain direct access to the federal
courts.
49 Id. at 935.
'o See id. at 936.
"' See id.
52 id.
" See id.
14 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4.
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The Agency announced a five-step framework for determining
whether a disparate impact exists that is subject to this private cause of
action." The steps are:
(1) To identify the population affected by the permit that triggered the
complaint. The affected population is that which suffers the
adverse impacts of the permitted activity;
(2) To determine the racial and/or ethnic composition of the affected
population;
(3) To identify which other permitted facilities, if any, are to be
included in the analysis and the racial and/or ethnic composition of
the population already affected by those permits. This is referred to
as the universe of facilities;
(4) To conduct a disparate impact analysis to determine whether
persons protected under Title VI are being impacted by the facility
at a disparate rate. The EPA expects the rates of impact for the
protected population and comparison populations to be relatively
comparable; and
(5) To use arithmetic or statistical analysis to determine whether the
disparity is significant under Title VI. After calculations, the EPA
may make a prima facie disparate impact finding, subject to the
recipient's opportunity to rebut.56
The recipient will have an opportunity to "justify" the decision to
issue a permit, based on legitimate, substantial interests of the recipient,
notwithstanding the resulting disparate impact." Demonstrating that the
permit complies with applicable environmental regulations will not
ordinarily be considered a legitimate justification.58 Rather, an articulable
value to the recipient must be found.59
The types of factors that will be considered in determining the
sufficiency of the justification can include the seriousness of the disparate
impact, whether the permit is a renewal (with demonstrated benefits) or for
a new facility (with more speculative benefits), and whether any of the
articulated benefits associated with the permit can be expected to assist the
affected minority community that is a subject of the complaint.6' An
offered justification will not be considered acceptable if there is a less
" See id. at 9-11.
16 See id.
" See id. at 12.
" See id.
'9 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12.
60 See id.
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discriminatory alternative that lessens the adverse disparate impact.6' This
approach -obviously will lead to increased environmental permitting
litigation. The statement of agency policy will likely have considerable
influence on courts who are, or soon will be, considering the same
question as in Chester.
Another section of the Guidance should be of even greater concern
to all managers involved in decisions to seek permit renewals. In the
section "Investigations of Allegedly Discriminatory Permit Renewals," the
Guidance provides:
Generally, permit renewals should be treated and analyzed
as if they were facility permits, since permit renewal is, by
definition, an occasion to review the overall operations of a
permitted facility and make any necessary changes.
Generally, permit renewals are not issued without public
notice and an opportunity for the public to challenge the
propriety of granting a renewal under the relevant
environmental laws and regulations.62
The potential legal and management impact of the Guidance is
enormous because it is clearly relevant to permit renewals. Consequently,
under the Guidance, disparate. impact claims may be brought directly in
federal court long after permits have been issued. Jeopardizing existing
permits by giving retroactive reach to environmental justice claims is
likely to cause considerable reluctance in related capital investment
decisions. Although unfortunate, a likely result is the abandonment of
otherwise beneficial economic development in the same minority and low-
income communities that Title VI was intended to benefit."3 In fact,
Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer is pushing to scale back federal involvement
in environmental justice cases because he wants to attract industry to
minority neighborhoods.6 Press reports indicate that some manufacturers
are avoiding black areas because of the interim guidance. 5
61 See id.
621 d. at 8.
63 See Henry Payne, 'Environmental Justice,' Kills Jobs for the Poor, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 1997, at A22.
"See Lynette Clemetson, A Green Bottom Line, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 53.
65 See Blumner, supra note 3, at C7.
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IX. THE EPA GUIDANCE IN ACTION: THE SHINTECH AND SELECT STEEL
DECISIONS
The "minority community economic development be damned"
approach is illustrated by the EPA's Shintech decision in February 1998.66
This case illustrated that a permit already granted by Louisiana'%
Department of Environmental Quality could be delayed.67 The stated
reason was that polluting industries locate in minority areas because their
residents are powerless to stop them. The action was taken despite local
NAACP polls that showed that seventy-three percent of the black residents
of Convent favored the plant location. 61 According to a lawyer
representing town residents, the EPA and opposing nonresident activists
also ignored the favorable opinions of all the locally elected black
officials. 69  The community residents were excited because the average
wage paid by Shintech was $12.00 to $15.00 per hour compared to the
prevailing community wages of $6.00 per hour.70 Shortly after the EPA's
decision, Shintech abandoned the project and moved to another location.7'
The Shintech decision has generated considerable criticism from
governors, mayors, and chambers of commerce because it is viewed as
failing to follow the interim guidance by taking into account the
demonstrated economic benefits of the facility for the community.72 Sadly
"when government actions are driven by public perception and' pressure
groups, those actions generally are responding to middle class concerns
and ignoring the problems of the poor.'" 3
6 See United States Environmental Protection Agency, In re: Shintech Inc., Order
Responding to Petititoners' Requests That the Administrator Object to Issuance of State
Operating Permits, Permit Nos. 2466-VO, 2467-VO, 2468-VO available at
<http://www.epa.gov/rgytgrnj/programs/artd/air/title5/t5memos/shin1997.pdf>
[hereinafter Shintech].67 See id. at 21.
68 See Payne, supra note 63, at A22.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See Vicki Ferstel, Environmental Justice Under Scrutiny, BATON ROUGE ADv., Feb. 7,
2000, at lB.
72 See John H. Cushman Jr., Pollution Policy is Unfair Burden, States Tell E.P.A., N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1998, at Al.
73 Cross, supra note 1, at 157.
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A result favorable to industry was handed down in an October 30,
1998, decision concerning Select Steel Corporation. ' In Select Steel, the
EPA's Office of Civil Rights carefully followed the five-step framework
previously discussed.75 The private complaint charged that the Michigan
Department of Environment Quality's permit for a steel recycling mill
would -lead to a discriminatory, disparate impact on minority residents in
Genesee County.76 The EPA followed the interim guidance's framework
by determining the affected population,77 determining the demographics of
the affected population,7" determining the universe of the facilities and the
total affected population, and conducting a disparate impact analysis.79
The EPA found that there was no affected population that suffered
"adverse" impacts within the meaning of Title VI. ° The EPA dismissed
the private complaint."' The decision was obviously influenced by the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's careful investigation of
the permit application that generally followed the EPA's guidance. The
decision signals that a permit applicant that initially applies the interim
guidance's five-step approach in preparing the application will likely
receive a reasoned response from the EPA.
X. MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES
Taken together, the president's executive order, the philosophy of
the Chester case recognizing a private cause of action, the EPA's interim
guidance for investigating Title VI private administrative complaints
challenging permits, and the EPA's application of the Guidance foretell an
explosion of regulatory and judicial activity in site permitting and
renewals. All parties involved, including managers, controllers, investors,
creditors, and auditors would be wise to consider the impact of these
developments. These developing concerns must be carefully managed.
First, the five-step framework established by the interim guidance and the
74 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT FILE No. 5R-98-R5
(SELECT STEEL COMPLAINT), available at <http://www.epa.gov/reg5oopa/pdf/
selsteel.pdf> [hereinafter SELECT STEEL COMPLAINT].
7 See supra text accompanying note 56.
76 See SELECT STEEL COMPLAINT, supra note 74, at 1.
77 See id. at 12.
78 See id.
79 See id.
8oSee id. at 25-27.
SI See id. at 40.
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EPA decisions in Shintech and Select Steel provide helpful guidance.
Recall that the EPA decision in Select Steel complimented the Michigan
state agency for essentially following the interim guidance. So the
following, at a minimum, should be accomplished prior to requesting a
permit:
* An evaluation of the population of the city and county surrounding
the property in question to determine the racial and ethnic
composition that will be affected by the permit.
* A survey and evaluation of other plant sites and facility permits in
the city and county.
* An evaluation of the impact of those facilities and permits on the
protected classes of race, color, national origin, or low-income
populations; and,
* A disparate impact analysis to determine whether protected persons
affected by the new facility will suffer a disparate impact and
whether the impact is significant.
Even if disparate impact is found, bear in mind that the permit may still be
"justified" based on a legitimate, substantial interest of the recipient. 2
Factors that may be considered are the seriousness of the disparate impact,
whether the permit is a renewal (with demonstrated benefits), or, perhaps
most importantly, whether the articulated benefits can be expected to assist
the minority community.3 Surely, as Mayor Dennis Archer advocates,
jobs and tax revenues can be considered a substantial benefit."
One other very practical concern that is not often addressed is how
to educate the affected community about the facility and its impact on
them. 5 Many applicants for permits allow activists with no connection to
the community to capture the issue and dominate the discussion.86
"Environmental activists tend to be white, middle-aged, middle-class
professionals-not young, blue collar workers or blacks." 7 They often do
not reflect the concerns of the poor minority residents. How then do you
beat the activists to the hearts and minds of citizens of the affected
community? One often overlooked way is to utilize Section 101 of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA").88 The section
82 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 12.
83 See id.
84 See Clemetson, supra note 64, at 53.
8 See Cross, supra note 1, at 155.
86 See id.
87 Id.
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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focuses on "productive -harmony" as the goal of federal actions, including
"social, ,economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans. 89 The section advocates the importance of
citizen participation and perspective through an interactive, integrated
process to improve final decisions, and discovering the "widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment."9  A way to preempt and manage
intrusion, has been developed by the environmental consulting firm of
James Kent and Associates of Aspen, Colorado.9 ' By going into the
community and informally identifying the leaders and disruptive issues
prior to the permitting process, the firm helps its clients avoid the kind of
activist interference that evolved in the Shintech case.92
Pre-permit application contact with community members provides
opportunities to integrate the project successfully with local leaders and
networks.93 The community contacts allow the permit applicant to
institute "issue tracking" mechanisms so citizens can understand how their
interests are being addressed, thereby building public support for the
project and focusing decision making on the informed interests of the
community. 94 Recognizing the values of the local community allows for
the social and physical environment to be linked together into a plan that
will accommodate their interests and achieve the "productive harmony"
contemplated by section 101 of the Act.95 Such action will signal to the
regulators that the permit applicant is accommodating the "community
interests" and, as in the Select Steel case, is likely to receive a favorable
response from the regulators.96
89 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
90 Id.,
9" See Interview with James Kent and Associates of Aspen, Colorado (transcript on file
with authors) [hereinafter Interview].
92 See id.
9' See id.
9 See id.
9' See id.
96 A prominent theme in a review of the National Environmental Policy Acts
effectiveness is "issue stacking." The term refers to issues identified at the professional
or community level that are catalogued, saved, and analyzed in the Environmental Impact
Statement process, thereby providing many opportunities for early resolution and
building community support. See Lynton Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance
of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REv. 203, 203-09
(1998).
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Some might express concern about the costs associated with
initially following the five-step framework of the interim guidance97 or the
section 101 citizen participation advocated by the Kent firm.98 The
alternative, however, of a contested permit surely is much more costly in
terms of money, personnel, and resources. The funds expended on pre-
permit management is money well-spent. In addition, business decision
makers will find that community support makes for a smoother transition
in other, non-environmental facets of siting a facility in a new town. It is
in a business' best interest to get the community involved, and the
diminution of a threat of a suit is just one of many reasons for better
community involvement.
XI. PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES
Another way to manage the problem might be to encourage
petroleum companies to reward or compensate communities for hosting a
facility such as an oil refinery. A compensation system ensures that all
who benefit from the facility pay the full cost that the facility imposes on
society.99  However, there are philosophical difficulties with
"encouraging" companies to pay communities for foisting oil refining
facilities on them. First of all, such "encouragement" often translates into
the legal obligation for firms to make pay-offs at some point in time for
such purposes. After all, if it is sound public policy to "encourage" the
petroleum industry to compensate host communities, it will reasonably be
asked why this should not be formalized in law. Moreover, suppose an oil
refiner refuses to do that which it is "encouraged" to do. This would
promote uneven results, and the calls to require that firms live up to their
compensatory duty will be overwhelming.
Secondly, and more basically, the direction of compensation is by
no means clear. There is indeed a case for forcing (or "encouraging") an
oil company to make a payment to the locality. After all, operating in that
vicinity will help the firm, or it would not have chosen to locate there. On
the other hand, the town gains as well, or it would not welcome the
company with open arms. More to the point, the people in the area benefit
from this commercial immigrant. With regard to paying this
97 See supra text accompanying note 56.98 See Interview, supra note 91.
99 See STEPHEN HUEBNER, ARE STORM CLOUDS BREWING ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE HORIZON? 21-22 (1998).
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"compensation," there are three options open to the new petroleum firm: it
can offer. wages below, equal to, or in excess of, those already prevailing.
If the oil company proffers less salary than presently being earned by the
local workers, they will spurn this opportunity. Even a roughly
comparable salary (with due consideration given to the non-monetary
aspects of the job) will likely be insufficient to woo them away from their
present employment; why leave your job for something that is not
preferable in any way? Only if the wage and working conditions package
is better than those already prevailing will the new corporation be able to
attract a labor force. Typically, the improvement must be substantial to
overcome the status quo.'oo Thus, if there is any compensating to be done,
there is at least as good a case that the local community should be
compensating the petroleum firm; the direction of compensation should
actually be reversed.
But all talk of compensation, in either direction stems from
economic illiteracy. All commercial interaction, whether in the goods or
labor market, is mutually beneficial in the ex ante sense. Both parties to a
trade expect to gain from it in some form, and this is their motivation for
entering into a transaction. Suppose, for example, that a housewife
purchases a fish for $4. She would not have done so if she places a value
on this item of less than this amount. Assume that she values it at $5.
Then she earns a profit of $1 on the deal. But the identical reasoning
applies on the other side of the equation. The retailer would never have
sold the fish at this price unless he valued it at less than this amount. Let
us suppose that he assigned a value to it of $3. Then he earns a profit of
$1 on the exchange. So, who should compensate whom for this sale? The
entire question is ludicrous. Both gain from it.'0' It is the same with the
location of the oil industry in the town; there is no warrant for
compensation in either direction, for the market is a mutually beneficial
institution.
100 As we have seen, the pay offered by Shintech was about $15.00 per hour compared to
the prevailing $6.00 community wage.
"01 In the ex ante sense, that is. In the ex post sense, the housewife may later learn that
her family had fish for lunch, and doesn't want to eat it for dinner as well. Had she
known that, she would not have made the purchase for any positive price. Thus, she
loses her entire expenditure. Similarly, a fish shortage might suddenly ensue, driving the
market price of fish up to $50. The seller, then, would greatly regret his precipitate sale.
The ex ante gains from trade are always positive, necessarily so. Ex post, they are only
usually positive, depending on the skills of the market participants.
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Suppose, however, that there is a winner and a loser. While this
cannot occur ex ante, it certainly could take place ex post. For example,
suppose the seller, but not the housewife, later comes to regret his
decision. That is, the price of fish rises to $50 right after the sale at $5
takes place, and the fish monger comes running after the housewife,
demanding compensation (or a rescission of the sale). What are we to
make of such a claim? It is abject nonsense, since the commercial
interaction was "for keepsies" in the terminology of the playground, and
not unilaterally revocable.02 The bottom line here, is that it is a
misunderstanding of the market to think that compensation should be
"encouraged" or legally mandated just because gains from trade are made.
Gains from trade are always made in the free market, and by both sides. If
compensation had to be made under such conditions, the death knell of
free enterprise would begin to toll.
XII. VOTE WITH FEET
We have seen above that, according to an NAACP poll in
Louisiana, seventy-three percent of the black residents favored a new oil
industry plant in their town.03 Some people may object and argue that
there are falsehoods in polls. Similarly, the views of black politicians
welcoming Shintech may also be disparaged by left wing
environmentalists'0 within the EPA noting that elected officials are chosen
on the basis of many criteria. Therefore, their views on any one issue such
as siting a plant may not be representative of those of their constituents.0 5.
102 Similarly, it would be just as wrong to "encourage" or force, the fishmonger to return
the housewife's money to her if she later came to regret her purchase, say, because her
family was tired of fish. Now it might be that the seller will do this in any case, in order
to keep a loyal customer, e.g., for the good will involved. But it should be no part of
public policy to "encourage" him to do so, and certainly not to require any such act on
his part.
'03 See Payne, supra note 63, at A22.
"0 "Left wing environmentalist" is by no means a tautology, nor, by the same token, is
"free market environmentalist" an oxymoron. For instances of the latter, see generally
Terry L Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Property Rights as a Common Pool Resource, in
BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC
GOVERNANCE (John Baden and Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981); TERRY L ANDERSON &
DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
" It is interesting to compare the dollar vote of the marketplace with the ballot box vote
of the political system in this regard. In the latter, "consumers" are allowed to express
themselves only once every two or four years; in the former, every day. In the political
system, the choice is limited toa "package deal." One must vote for Clinton or Bush
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But there is one indication of black acceptance of the "environmental
racism", of plant location in their areas which cannot so easily be
dismissed: "voting with one's feet."
Consider again the fact that black response to hazardous material
sittings .has been to move toward these locations after they have been set
up. ' 6 This shows, perhaps in a way that no other evidence can, the true
evaluation on the part of poor blacks of these plant locations; it is one of
enthusiastic approbation.
It was no coincidence that there was only one-way Jewish traffic
with regard to Nazi Germany in the late 1930s; no Jews wanted to enter,
all wanted to leave. Similarly, immigration in the 1950s was to the U.S.
and from Cuba, not the other way around. Likewise, the movement across
the Berlin"Wall was from East to West, not from West to East."7 Another
indication of where life was better concerned blacks in the U.S. south
during the Jim Crow decades. Very few moved from Detroit, Chicago,
New York and Philadelphia to Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas; the
overwhelming majority moved in the opposite direction. The point is,
when people are free to migrate, can telephone or write encouraging
messages to their friends and family still "back home," and the migration
continues, this is some of the strongest evidence we have as social
scientists that geographical relocation is an improvement."°8
overall, for example, and cannot pick Clinton on monetary, trade and farm policy, and
Bush on labor, taxes and "ethics." In very sharp contrast, in the economic market it is
possible to focus one's vote. This may be done so narrowly as to distinguish between
colors and brands of cars and ties, for example. For the case that voters are not at all akin
to consumers, examine the claim of the Public Choice School. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1971); WALTER BLOCK & THOMAS DiLORENZO, A
CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF THE STATE (forthcoming).
' See Lambert & Boerner, supra note 15 passim.
107 On the importance of voluntary migration patterns as an indication of the underlying
social welfare involved, see generally THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A
WORLD VIEW (1996).
o8 Very few people will question the fact the Jews were better off away from the Nazis,
Cubans escaping Castro, Germans out from under the yoke of the Communists, and
blacks free of Jim Crow restrictions. But the same analysis can be applied to several
other much more controversial cases. For example, black migration patterns were
toward the Republic of South Africa in pre-Mandela days. This suggests that as bad as
the white apartheid regime was for these peoples, it was an improvement over the
neighboring black run countries. Similarly, the migration from the countryside to the
cities during the Industrial Revolution indicates that these changes constituted an
improvement in the lives of the poor, not a retrogression. On this latter case, see
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The fact that poor and black people are attracted to the higher
paying jobs in -the petroleum industry is very strong evidence that they
regard the package of slightly dirtier air and higher wages as preferable to
the slightly cleaner air and lower wages back where they came from.
Nothing could more dramatically indicate that in the eyes of ostensible
"victims" of environmental racism, this was a good thing. In effect the
blacks are saying, "if this is environmental racism, we want more of it."
XIII. PATERNALISM
However, these arguments are not good enough for the EPA and
others who complain about "environmental racism." For not only are they
left wing environmentalists, they are paternalists as well-a poisonous
combination.
What is paternalism? It is the view that the elites'" know better
what benefits the people (particularly the poor and blacks) than do they
themselves. Since the elites know better, they also adopt the right to
impose their vision on these people "for their own good." Nowhere is this
mind set more clearly articulated than in the debate now raging over social
security."' The underlying premise of this program is that the people have
too high a rate of time preference (or are too stupid) to be able to save for
their old age. Therefore, the government is justified in forcing them to do
"in their own interest" what they (perversely) do not now believe to be in
their own interest.""
For example, "... there is some justification for the government to
mandate, as the Chilean government does in its private system, sufficient
saving during working years so that most people will have a privately
provided old age income that exceeds the designated income floor."' 2
The minor objection to Barro is that it is somewhat misleading to call the
Chilean system "private" in that it stems from the barrel of the
generally CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS (F. A. Hayek ed., 1954), which includes
essays by T. S. Ashton, L. M. Hacker, W. H. Hutt, and B. de Jouvenel.
109 See THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED (1995) (calling elites "the
anointed").
"' See Robert J. Barro, Don't Tinker with Social Security. Reinvent It, 4 HOOVER DIGEST
11 (1998).
... See id.
112 Id.
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government's gun."' A more serious one is that it implies that unless
savings "exceeds' the designated income floor," the government will step
in with 'a welfare program (e.g., rob the parsimonious Peter to pay the
spendthrift Paul). But why should the government engage in massive theft
from the more thrifty? Another difficulty has to do with the rate of time
preference. Why do the paternalists of the world assume that one time
preference is better than another, and that the government can unerringly
hit upon the "correct" one. Certainly, no reasons are given in support of
this curious contention.
Perhaps the most serious objection of all to paternalism, at least
from the point of view of its adherents, is that this doctrine is logically
incompatible with our democratic institutions. And this applies to all
paternalism, whether concerned with child labor, minimum wages,
maximum hours, savings or, in the present case, "environmental racism."
If there are people so stupid, so childlike, so unsophisticated, so
unworldly, so simple-minded, so credulous, so unwary, that their savings
or geographical locational decisions cannot be relied upon, then why and
how can they be entrusted with the vote? Why should we not, according
to this very mischievous argument, take away the suffrage from all blacks,
all poor people, and all those whose savings rate is not to the liking of our
rulers? Needless to say, down this path lies totalitarianism and fascism.
All men of good will, of necessity, would have to pull back from this
logical abyss with horror. But then the same may be said of the
"environmental racism" which is an integral part of this perspective.
XIV. CONCLUSION
But we have not yet plumbed the depths of this philosophy. So far
we have only scratched the surface, showing how "environmental racism"
law is a legal and administrative nightmare, will harm its supposed
beneficiaries, constitutes a "taking" against the petroleum industry," 4
attacks private property rights, and is paternalistic. It is now time to take
off the gloves and challenge the underpinnings of the EPA's version of
"environmental justice" by taking a people friendly, economically
" Try not saving as much as this government thinks is good for you and see what
happens. To be sure, it is reasonable to distinguish between a program imposed by the
government and one run by it, but the former is not private and the latter public. Both
are within the purview of the government.
"" See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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responsible, and environmentally concerned approach to the siting of
facilities.
